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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
 To Mind the Elephant 
 
by 
 
 Casey Thomas Polacheck 
Master of Fine Arts in Visual Arts 
University of California San Diego, 2019 
Professor Amy Helene Adler, Chair 
 
 
The series of paintings and exhibition titled To Mind The Elephant depicts the 
isolated uses and suggested effects of material objects used in the environmental and 
psychological enrichment of elephants in zoological captivity. These simple tools of 
animal care are understood as analogous in function to both the artistic practice and 
viewership. The artworks and objects described shared qualities of perception, creativity, 
agency and experience between humans and other animal species when their cognitive 
processes and responses are considered.
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Figure 1.1: Monosemy, 2019, Casey Polacheck, oil on panel, 18 x 24 in 
The thesis exhibit To Mind the Elephant contains an ongoing series of paintings depicting a 
selection of what will be referred to as environmental enrichment objects. These are materials placed 
among elephant enclosures by their human keepers. They are singular, sometimes colorful plastic, wooden, 
stone, metal, or rubber items, such as tires, barrels, planks and posts for the animal to interact with. Systems 
of them are seen suspended from rope attached to otherwise bare tree trunks. Some are depicted strewn 
across the ground with no clear intention. Each of the objects themselves holds a position pivoting or 
swinging at angles that both illustrate and suggest activity. They are part of sparse landscapes, sometimes 
shadowed and tiered, creating elevation changes and sites for the objects balance and sway. 
Through painting, depicting and asking an audience to mobilize these objects mentally shows 
hints of their zoological intentions. Their invented staging operates with some oblique description of an 
audience, and relationship to the intended animal user. The objects are often elevated among zoo 
enclosures, these objects often have dual purposes as displays for human and animal. In one case, they are 
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useful as to draw out the animal to an active space of a human viewer, and for the animal, these objects are 
markers of a connection between their environment and themselves. Locating the viewer in these spaces, 
and in positions relative to the objects’ intended users is key in setting up tension between the human and 
animal. 
         In this series I am inclined to depict the spaces these objects are located in as ambiguous, hinting 
at depth and expanse, but shown with hints of the artificial, the shallow, the forced perspective. A 
relationship to painting history builds here. Isolating them among an ambiguous and open landscape begins 
to suggest scenarios of these objects having impact on environments beyond zoos. What functions might 
these objects perform in enriching space beyond enclosures? Could these forms ask questions of spaces and 
conditions of agencies in the world and perception as a whole? Their isolation also calls forth questions of 
the objects strategic use, that an object and its engagement can in turn affect or enrich an environment. 
Isolating these examples of enrichment objects stages a test of their efficacy. 
In most institutional cases, these environmental enrichment objects are tools and strategies for 
encouraging investigative behaviors of many species, like foraging for food, or seeking stimuli signs of 
prey and peer – some form of novel perception in the environment to offer a change and an effect for the 
animal. The objects’ function is to also provide forms of agency and expression given the animals’ fixed 
settings, to allow opportunity for their experience to be impressed upon the environment, to show evidence 
of their force, whether it be a push or a pull on a given object. Among their many intended effects in the 
zoo context, these materials act as psychologically benefitting tools of investigation, simple yet sustaining 
sources of activity for the animal’s mind to work through. The objects and training achieved with them are 
used to provide, as best as materially possible, activities that are analogous to the animals’ natural modes of 
living in the wild. Dr. Hal Markowitz suggests in his Enriching Animal Lives, a kind of handbook for 
designing enrichment objects for captive animals, that objects should be cheap, durable, safe for the animal, 
and accessible for their human caregivers to readily distribute. It is implied in the zoological use of these 
environmental enrichment objects, EEOs if need be, that they contain some notion of an alternative 
experience of nature, another reflection of ancestry, of life attended to with different goals, different 
tensions, perhaps fear or scarcity. For these researchers and their animals, supported by studies since the 
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1970s, within a plastic tube are subtle transmissions of other modes of life, imagined structures of thinking 
through and considering minds and activity not immediately represented on the surface of these objects or 
implied in the weight of their play against gravity. And as counterparts, the paintings representing these 
objects offer similarly open-ended demonstrations of the overlapping functions and effects, of mediating 
experiences both lived and imagined. The paintings operate as oblique representations of another mind’s 
activity, and in turn, echoes of another environment and animal or self. At some level, the cognitive 
operations of EEOs and representational paintings are structurally bound. 
So in fourteen paintings of similarly small size, the varied types of forms used by caregivers of 
elephants are rendered isolated on ambiguously defined, sparsely populated fore and backgrounds. Within 
each painting, the objects and landscapes are somewhat plain in shape and function, seen from an 
unmanned vantage of an assumed passerby, yet are potent in their prominent placement on the landscape 
and composition. Each depicted enrichment object swings statically, holding a position of activity in 
midair, or balanced precariously. Each position hints at, but is absent of, a known animal presence that 
would hold upright, displace or shift the object. 
The viewer is left with actions to infer, complete, or empathically imagine the forces and 
intentions of the object. Presented with a moment to enact this role, of the elephant striking against a tree 
trunk or pushing a swinging, tethered post’s significant weight against the downward pull of gravity. This 
process, though seeming rudimentary in reading, establishes a practical connection between human and 
elephant. There are many logical paths to imagining the elephant, each as sequence of steps the human 
viewing such a scene navigates mentally, and not entirely on the surface of the painting. A human viewer 
mentally articulates elephant’s proposed actions, defines the potential of the object, then relates those 
forces to an effect. 
Vinciane Despret, in her series of essays “What would the animal say if we asked the right 
questions?,” suggests that he knowledge sought by studies of animal behavior and cognition begin as 
human-formed conceits. In one, she illustrates what has best guided my research questions – As the animals 
function in allegory, similar is their role in sciences and humanities, building and conforming to these 
constructions. But her statements shift when considering what happens to those structures of meaning when 
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the animal knows something of its test parameters. What does the elephant know of itself in front of that 
blank sheet of paper? 
So rather than target the complete animal, image or author, I value where these “theory of mind” 
practices strike as an potential expansions of philosophies, humanities, as well as where histories and 
functions of traditional representation and art viewership are elaborated to include new targets and news 
means of investigating what they might produce. These changes in definitions, moves towards more 
biosemiotic categories. This provides a source of identifying and creating the kinds of symbolic or 
perceptive functions as sources of pictorial tensions or crises of image, as Rene Magritte or Mark Tansey 
might phrase or render them to highlight their symbolic function. But these are other moments of 
consilience. 
I attempt to take in discussions of the scientific image and what it is required to perform. Early 
ethologist Jakob von Uexkull used the term “the farthest plane” to describe where a visual or perceptive 
field truncates, and such an idea might relate to incomplete views of species, imperfect picture planes. 
Beyond where a scientific image must perform dutifully for its subject and audience, I am interested in 
constructing an image that knows itself to be part of that system of knowledge production. 
The pictorial operates with the most potent ability to enact, to construct histories and trajectories 
of meaning and narrative fore and aft. And still, it can contend with itself, its interpretation, with its own 
making or analogous use. Experience functions in this similarly fractured and fraught way. Image and 
meaning making offer analogous creation processes. These are each piecemeal efforts towards developing 
an approximate psychological understanding of the animal other or alternative scenario. Both are imperfect 
constructions towards representing a species. Together, marks play off the mental search images, models, 
scenarios and accumulated knowledge register against one another. Cognitive studies, animal studies, and 
any usefulness in the structures of visual culture can account together this way, as flawed representations, 
something like an a priori attempt at the other. The shared criteria between these modes are the sites of 
productive shifts, categories of affect and understanding that can expand one another. 
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Figure 1.2: Concrete Jungle III, 1990 Alexis Rockman, oil on wood 96 x 64 in 
Watching one animal deceive another, a human viewer might ask, “How does the animal conceive 
of their audience’s attention?” An animal watching the human linger at a tree for hours without foraging, 
might arrive at their own question, “Does the human have need of food?” Who produces the structures of 
thought that develop such questions? Who answers? What mediates these attentions? In response, I focus 
less on the species-comparative efforts, and rather attempt to display attention towards the affecting 
behaviors and conditions by imagining varied structures of knowledge and mediated experiences of 
another. This kind of social cognition between species as between viewers and subjects, or between object 
and acting body, offers potent, but non-exacting maneuvers. That the human is unable to fully engage an 
experience of the animal, provides a rich distance to investigate from. The animal marks out a space of 
imagination, approximation, and productive fallibility for the human authored experience. So, what parcels 
of experience can alter meaning for both subjects simultaneously? What does the method of responding to 
object and image, with no immediate result form the experience other than the experience itself do for the 
animal? What does it do for us to try to engage through those same structures of play? 
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By acting out several elements of this scene, the viewer begins to approach an understanding of 
the environmental enrichment strategy. Their role as viewer is restaging the goal of psychological inquiry 
into the environmental and material relationships of the animal, as well as its meaning making abilities. The 
paintings offer that same set of relationships, only pictorially. These objects, including their construction, 
and their representations, all function analogously together. Elephants are known through corroborating 
folklore and scientific study to recollect a wealth of experience with an ability map their environments 
cognitively. Megafauna in general have been documented as having profoundly expansive effects upon the 
landscape and ecosystems they participate in as they move through their territories. Again, the mental and 
physical effects intersect. And here I at least attempt to map that onto human experience. 
Also, the image that a term like species-specific behavior conjures can function like an 
encyclopedia entry, with the entry as one image standing for all. But I see enrichment objects not so much 
pushing against these definitions, instead valuing the individual, the individual’s experience and exhibition 
of that behavior. Most human made representations of animals had often filtered this out. When animals 
were utilized as subjects, they became restricted by human concern. Humans and nonhuman animals are all 
filters and producers of experience. That difference and diffraction of experience creates unique mental 
representations of worlds not easily shared between species. Attempts to arrange paint into forms can be 
considered in that same manner. Then, as they carry out the psychological function for their users and 
audiences, the paintings themselves also function for me as a significant return to a more fundamental 
framing of painting practice, and an unexpected refining and reflection of personal attention towards 
thought, presence, setting expectations of creative life, and aesthetic function. 
In this series of paintings, though they are simple in function among exclusively human material 
culture, the EEOs act as vessels for a kind of quiet interspecies ethnography – a study of the meaning and 
material relationships shared between humans and other beings, as suggested in a survey of similarly 
framed artwork collected by Eben Kirksey in The Multispecies Salon. 
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Figure 1.3: Self Portrait of the Artist at Work, 2012, Casey Polacheck, oil on panel, 12 x 16 in 
In 2012 I painted an image titled “Self-Portrait of the Artist at Work”, a small oil painting on panel 
depicting an Indian Elephant and its’ trainer or mahout practicing painting together at a large easel among 
the sun and shade of an unspecified sanctuary facility. With that work, what began as a speculative joke 
eventually furthered my interest in the difficulties of studying animal cognition through an analogy with 
visual art perception and production. By using combined considerations of art making, cultural 
anthropology of art, and art history to site scenarios molded out of animal studies I was able to find 
productive play within transmissions between different qualities of species, mind, image and meaning 
making. The majority of my studies as an MFA candidate likely stemmed from the inquiry leading up to 
this particular painting. There merged thoughts of evolutionary psychology and cognition, cultural 
transmission, and perhaps a glancing reflection on structures of depiction from art history. I did not 
conceive of other permutations for some years. 
I previously on slightly knew of some specific animals were observed in research setting and 
given painting materials as a way to mildly investigate the outcomes, but more frequently as appeal to 
humans. Desmond Morris’ work with the Chimpanzee Congo documented in his 1952 Biology of Art. 
Beyond allegories seen or heard of in Hokusai’s tale of the elegant landscape paintings of a fowl, or the 
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automatic painting of a donkey’s brushing tail, dogs, dolphins, pigs, birds, apes, monkeys and others were 
staged with their marks and implement. In its most earnest form, the studies were attempts to crack the 
division between the vaunted registers of process and products of human perception and creativity, opposed 
to the closest analogous approximations seen in non-human activity. As other biological studies of 
evolution moved beyond Darwin’s Origin of the Species and rather furthering the studies more contained 
within his later work on emotional affect, social and reproductive behavior, and expression within what 
what later be defined as its ecosystem, researchers also began testing cognition and psychological 
development through mark-making studies. It was only a research model, but in some discourse, it was an 
inevitable encroaching of the animal. Within art, the studies were interpreted as affronts to painters. Morris 
himself was a painter, in addition to primatologist, a surrealist in manner. But the chimpanzee painting 
studies similar to Morris’ could be seen in others like Kohler and others, all researching with their 
respective animals in the first two decades of the 20th century, as painting discourse only had just begun to 
leave behind a strict yet vague commitment to verisimilitude for nonrepresentational affect or motive.  Had 
the paradigm shifts in both science and art of the time been less defensive, the research questions of these 
art wielding primatologists might have been reframed as a question of looking for colleagues of either field. 
         But does your colleague recognize themselves as such? Do they reflect upon the decisions that 
deploy their marks? What else do they associate with that effort, and what is recalled of the process when 
the art object leaves their sight? I had seen footage of elephants being trained to render an elephant likeness 
on their painting surfaces with clear ability. Most human viewers would be able to quickly identify the 
subject of the painting before the animal finished the few fluid lines that made up its four appropriately 
articulated limbs or curving trunk and tusks. But it was not the deftness with which the animal wielded a 
brush or color that fascinated me. Noticing the mahout’s crop in hand, and inferring the likely limited value 
and unwillingness of the elephant toward its task, I felt skeptical of the image produced. It was the notion 
that an animal held within – either gained through human interaction and training or otherwise, still 
independently maintained – an inexact representational form of itself that it quite possibly did not associate 
with, yet it achieved through proprioceptive attention. 
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Beyond this confounding scene of the elephant, its painting and its anonymous trainer, there were 
questions I struggled with, being an often painting animal myself. Not only was the elephant’s image of 
itself one of psychological tension as it represented the self, but the activity of painting seemed to be 
disjointed from that image. My response to the scene was a composition likely read first as in structure. It 
depicted an elephant rendering itself in the act of mark making. But at the time, I was struggling to 
articulate other questions of my own interests and tendencies as an artist: Does that ability to render oneself 
in that act of creation give that discreet image and the depicted process of its making or considerations give 
greater depth or cognitive/creative power? Aren’t all representational efforts moored in this same 
relationship to their own being and difference? I wondered if there were other ways of appreciating both the 
lacking properties as well as hidden values of the self-image, or the awareness of a process like painting as 
feedback upon the environment, like an elephant may carve its well worn paths upon the land. 
There were other questions within that painting. It produced a curious structure for thinking 
through other narratives of representing animals, and representations belonging to the animal, either mental 
or physical. How else might they map their experiences or environments? What non-food material 
relationships create the most significant experiences? Where are meanings constructed in play? Where can 
insight form creativity? 
In that painted scene, the transmission of culture, however it should be defined, could be 
witnessed as shared between human and elephant. Though it certainly might have been in part sourced from 
traumas of denaturing, confinement, and at times physical abuse, most significantly to me was it that sitting 
on the easel, a pad of paper with that coarse linear elephant in profile was a compelling form of culture 
coaxed from that plain white surface. It was achieved by years of scaffolding prompts from human trainers. 
And though it might have failed certain psychological criteria and motivations, that resulting image had to 
be considered. Was it a deceptive vanity and our own bias towards the graphic communication and 
entertainment that spurred through the teaching of these activities, or imaginative inquiry to stage art as this 
fundamental interspecies production? I sought to look for other forms of this exchange were tangible for 
both non-human and human facilitator. Mirrors, puzzle boxes, masks, screens, models made up my 
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collections of tools. As an MFA candidate, fields and ideas of biomimicry, observations of animals’ folk 
concepts of physics and eventually readings in biosemiotics all arose in that new line of questioning. 
I take a continued interest in directing these attentions between modes of nature and culture, 
sorting how one can navigate and define interactions of mental and physical space. The objects are able to 
illustrate the ideas behind the enrichment strategy. Demonstrating how these tools develop, complicate, and 
compel how the animal relates sequences of behavior and environment does give them an unusual symbolic 
power despite their simple forms and physical function. They are intended as didactic things. Where they 
are objects of non-materially productive play, like images and their contained subjects, they are active 
bridges between the conditions of captivity and nature. A richer imagined world emanates from that object, 
and denotes the changes of that environment. A barrel swings from a long dead tree. A box tilts towards the 
waning sun. When they consider both the captive and ancestrally wild animal’s life, cognitive processes 
and environment, there are slippages between modes of play, behavior, experience and imagination.  
These paintings function in a way that is a representation of the elephant’s world. She presses a 
lever, or she spins a top, and the world is changed. Archimedes would propose, “Give me a lever long 
enough and a fulcrum on which to place it, and I shall move the world”. These elephants’ objects perform 
an application of that idea, but their goal is not to perform with such scale complexity. It is to show the 
simple shared quality of experience, to move between the human and the elephant. That these objects are 
worth considering as artforms for another species, that even without their labels of human concepts, hey 
facilitate interactions between the physical and mental worlds within and perceived from external sources. 
Recognizing the mobility of an object, discovering its impact and the ability of the environment to shift in 
form, to be represented and affected in an indirect way. In general, that an animal’s psychological needs or 
function may strike as roughly similar to that of human is useful, however argument by analogy between 
species cuts away information about differing valuation of shared environments or activities. In some cases, 
study of animals by humans can overlook the roles that the individual animals themselves enact in those 
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human modeled scenarios, and degrades the importance of the environment they’re in.  
 
Figure 1.4: Engraving from  Mechanics Magazine published in London in 1824. 
Similar to the research scenarios described in Povinelli’s Folk Physics of Chimpanzees, where the 
researcher reflects on the scaffolding understanding of physical relationships of materials by apes, the 
enrichment objects allow for an exploration of a dynamically changing world, one where outcomes are 
varied. Through their use, environmental factors are learned to be interdependently related and cannot be 
predictably accounted for without experience. In other words, it is the process of engaging with the 
enrichment object that produces the effect upon the animal’s mental processes and its consideration of its 
environment, not prescribed by the object itself. 
Though the reasons for and methods of zoological confinement are less the concern here, the 
environment of captivity does provide a specific set of conditions and vantages that can speak to distance 
and mediation. Within enrichment strategies, implemented objects or series of actions are provided for the 
animals to bring out species-specific behavior that their captive spaces do not immediately allot for.  With 
this, they are objects containing and in some way simulating the spaces and behaviors of wild creatures.  
By showing the animal user and viewer that their contexts can shift, it also intended to encourage them to 
register the present changes that they themselves can produce upon the environment. The creatures 
Heidegger once viewed as “poor in world”, through the effect of objects he would also qualify as 
“worldless”, all receive the benefit of some semblance of a world they do not immediately, physically 
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inhabit. There is a mental step to make with the enrichment object’s use: put another way, the elephant 
knocks a ball from one world into another. 
I’m led to think of a scene from Abbot’s Flatland, when a sphere from the three-dimensional 
world passes into the characters’ two dimensional existence. It expands and shrinks again, seen as only a 
circle from the two-dimensional characters perception, and they begin to comprehend its unknown 
volumes. When excluding information from a subjective view, the nonhuman can be considered as actors 
representing themselves in fictional settings, with their capacities lent to a narrative external to their own. I 
attempt to avoid getting stuck at this level of rhetoric by using targets belonging to neither species, objects 
intended for their affecting function, where mutual attentions become layered together. By sharing in visual 
and material culture, as well as the attached behaviors and their interpretation, we can provide mutual 
ground for looking and communicating. 
 In this body of work, my intentions were to ask what enrichment strategies are performing, where 
they’re seen, how they I arrive at this series of paintings after years of oblique searching. It was not the first 
time that my trajectory as an artist has doubled back in some way, and find new depth. Though I don’t 
always attempt the subject, for many years I have been stuck on the challenges found in tasking myself 
with the representation of animals, and dissecting the obstacles and loops of thought that kind of enacting 
required. The animal’s role, when described as a major “other” depicted throughout human art history, is 
our species’ likely first examples of a reflexive metaphor. For us, they prompted a challenging reading of 
other life, the close yet often imperceptible relationship between minds. John Berger lays out the scene 
across ancient plains, they were both targets and surfaces not only for tools of hunting but projections of 
our own narratives and models of thinking. They changed how we saw other parts of the world, other 
phenomena and forms. Stones among the cave were then chosen as painting surfaces for their likeness to 
animal forms, building up that ability to search for and discern relationships between experiences. Early 
humans’ picture making contorted elements of natural world into representations of other parts, and merged 
them with our own mental images, imagined narratives and desires. The animal, the entity first experienced 
as clear and relatable “other” to the human species moved as it reacted to us. It acted out its own worlds, 
and helped us form the logical structures of our own. It looked back, sharing evidence of its sentience. In 
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framing my studies this way, I am informed by two symposia held just off campus at the Salk Institute, 
CARTA’s semi-annual meetings, most recently on Technology & Tool Use and Imagination in our current 
and historical modes. There, discourse and studies of anthropogeny helped me reconstruct questions of 
what was afforded to the animal in those first interactions. Even to name them was to delineate what 
apparently could not name itself, to relegate life that was unable to share its own systems of thought. What 
the animal did not manifest for itself, humans invented around them, including conceptions of self. In 
attempts to understand and employ those distinct beings as subjects, that continuous imagery of the animal-
other proliferated. It propels curiosity towards the animal, towards shedding our layers of invention upon 
the animal. The human effort to be best attentive to the animal has hopes of seeing the creature for itself, all 
inventions shed. This might be achieved by the animal exhibiting its own creativity, so that humans may 
witness a signification, valuation or sublimation beyond a human source. 
What was our willingness to ask such questions at that first encounter? Prior to any narratives of 
Adam’s naming of the beasts, and before Linnaeus, who self-described as the “Second Adam”, had drafted 
and ordered taxons of known beings, I think vague ideas of speciation were sparked there upon the painted 
wall, a division as the set picture plane. There we looked to the marks that make the image, like we look to 
the animal – as evidence of a narrative both within and outside of ourselves. Narrative and image produce 
what can be an idealized story, but it can be unapproachable just the same, conceptually flighty. Thomas 
Nagel’s “What Is it Like to Be a Bat?” speaks to the intractable task of understanding a nonhuman 
subjectivity. To his view, the effort to do so is an asymptote, a line that never intersects. But to refer back to 
Berger’s view, we choose to depict the animal not as reliable witnesses of non-human life, but from a 
knowingly unclear human position, with human factored attentions and values unavoidably attached. 
Even when present in close proximity, an experience of the animal occurs imaginatively, from 
human vantages, through fences lining space and knowledge. Though the barriers between human and 
animal subjectivity are partially permeable through scientific practice, this artistic body of work is not 
simply a concern of linear paths drawn through nature. The function of these depictions of objects, like 
images animals, is to look but also to comfortably not know. Referring to an installation by natural history 
focused artist, Mark Dion, Norman Bryson writes, “Nature and animals become not fixed entities fully 
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explained by hierarchies of natural order but provocative forces  whose properties remain radically 
unknown and unknowable.”  
For years after that paint by number mountain lion, I was left wondering what that early effort as a 
paint-wielding animal achieved. What abilities did I exercise or gain? Who was ultimately creating this 
image? What had I learned of the animal, assembled somewhere between the image on the box, my 
previous effort as a curious young researcher, my mental image, both prescribed and distorted into what 
laid before me? That tension between a frustrated projection and an unsatisfied execution remained part of 
my pictorial practice for many years. The animal was an idealized form, where at some level, one depicted 
instance of a creature had to correlate and stand for all others of that species. As my conceptual questioning 
and structures advanced with age and experience, each project had to maneuver and perform flawlessly 
birds imagined and rendered in flight. And I carried this for much of my time as a graduate student. It 
incapacitated me for quite some time. 
I work with animal imagery and subjects for much of the same reason they are deployed in fables 
and cartoons. I do not aim to distance myself from those uses. By considering what the structures of such 
thought require of the creator and the viewer. John Berger’s essay “Why Look at Animals?” describes the 
valuable layers of simultaneous readings and meanings shared between human and animal. And continuing 
that trajectory, I can find most examples of anthropomorphizing to be productive associations. Steve Baker 
writes in “Representing Animals” on anthropomorphization as a generative tool, as any movement between 
conceptual registers would. They can be read as characterizations of the human, caricature and 
exaggeration as the traits and behaviors of human life overlapping their wilder forms. But I intend to 
productively and approvingly compare my efforts as an artist to the elephant’s repetitious batting at a tree 
trunk or form of plastic to know my effect, to know my inner workings.   In the production of this series of 
paintings, I held the previously experienced object in mind and rendered what I conceived of its connection 
to its surroundings, established my own with it, and encountered my abilities to perceive and change it, 
wield its relationships, and fundamentally give it shape as I conceive of it. 
I contrast what has been a difficult process of widening my practice, my attention and appreciation 
of what creative production asked of me. I spent much of my MFA years looking to complicate, to 
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purposefully and productively turn in a labyrinth I did not know, and it frustrated me to attempt that. But 
the solutions and growth were in simplifying and refining.  It echoed in what this whole project has meant 
to me, how I struggled to know it, to feel it, and engage with it through doubt, avoidance, and fear. I had to 
learn myself through a series of objects by pushing myself against a relatively simple machine. I too moved 
objects around, sought anything useful on the Southern California landscape, all along trying to understand 
what potential those strange things encountered could perform for me, to anxiously apply those findings. I 
watched others press their intellectual and physical weight against their respective objects and ideation, and 
saw my work as limited and unproductive. 
Solutions and insight came from unexpected teaching sources while this series took shape. In the 
wake of various expressions of personal mental health and overwhelming rumination as to why I was 
following yet failing at a path that I had determined for myself, I arrived at a beginning meditation practice 
in the last year of the MFA experience. I had fumbled objects of meditation intermittently for years -– the 
free flow of the breath, any patience with my visual field, discomforting sensations in the body, thoughts, 
the elusive and illusory sense of self. Sitting and gazing into space, sometimes at physical objects, 
sometimes at light and shadow, I was prompted with phrases like “Who’s looking?” and instructed to 
simply witness shifting color behind my eyelids. Like with the elephants and their objects, I was 
encouraged by my own caregivers to see this as benefiting me psychologically, to concern myself with 
something more immediate rather than ruminated. Outside of the accumulated texts of art history, scientific 
and theoretical readings, it was my extracurricular work to salvage and reframe how I engaged with 
experience. It quickly became a mode where I attempted to unknot my difficulties motivating and justifying 
creative production and research, to limit projection and rumination and appreciate simple unprompted 
movements of mind and matter. Mostly, it was a place to grow confident in not knowing, but witnessing. 
In Dzogchen traditions of meditation, the approach to dissolving a construction of the self is 
taught as a path. Unlike other teachings, it is summarized as “the path that clarifies confusion.” It is an 
expansive and narrowed looking without knowing or anticipating the cause or outcome. Elsewhere in this 
extracurricular practice, I encountered an image or diagram that just as likely would have appeared in 
Alexis Rockman’s more didactic or palimpsestic compositions of natural history narratives of evolutionary 
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trees depicted with modern materials and contexts. The traditional image depicts and describes meditation 
practice as a winding path, populated by several animal characters to represent aspects and forces of the 
meditator’s mind. They are both antagonistic and supporting figures. An elephant represents the difficult of 
the mind, resistant to being led, prone to its own whims of distraction and will. The elephant changes color 
in this diagram of mindfulness practice, becoming more cooperative and present. 
  Throughout the last several years as a visual art student, I sought to complicate and contextualize 
my interests in animal cognition and metaphorical relationships to intersect with painting practice. But with 
this body of work, it was a need of simplification, a reduction to fundamental experience and perception 
that allowed me to produce the works. I began the series as a mode of practice, after noting the changes 
between visits to San Diego Zoo and Safari Park’s elephant enclosures, I began creating studies during my 
visits. I was seeking to research and jumpstart other projects. Some weeks, a tire swung from one post, 
where a blue ball later replaced it. The containers of food hung some 18 feet in the air. The initial efforts 
were made to bolster painting practice. An elephant’s object painted became an effort to swing a pendulum 
of production back. Painting an object to know its psychological effect became my goal. Like a narrative of 
a Dzogchen practitioner, the production itself became the demonstration. 
The decisions to paint these sites and objects is informed by enrichment strategies as well. In 
zoological garden settings, the objects used are rotated often or some cases daily for variation of activities 
and behavioral responses to be encouraged and expressed. In broader contexts, these objects are used to 
encourage social bonding when shared between multiple animals, foraging behaviors, and other forms of 
environmental awareness. Visual art, as a mode of organizational thinking, can help us encourage us to 
build relationships of meaning, experience, and environment. We develop associations, determine patterns, 
and do our best to demystify our surroundings. We attempt to convey our vague findings to one another 
through repetition and demonstrations. The same is seen in the elephant as it tosses a barrel over a ravine, 
other elephants and humans looking on in the distance. A groove is worn into the earth at chain length. 
Paint accumulates at the horizon line. Markers of thought are made manifest on the land. 
A final point of consideration in this project stemmed from trying to contextualize my work within 
a family history that brought me to UC San Diego, something that burdened me with quite a bit of guilt, 
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confusion and hesitation that both marked and sustained my time here. I have avoided or refused to attach it 
to my life as an artist, though I know it informs, or at least has facilitated my making. My creative work did 
not contain any tangible signs or acknowledgement for those narratives as a fortunate son of an immigrant 
family. I could not reconcile playing with images of elephants and chimpanzees with the hardships 
members of my family navigated before me. I could not address my world the same way, knowing and 
feeling the difficult circumstances other families faced or were threatened with at the border. Recently, in 
Geisel Library, a curated display of regional history helped appease some of this self-imposed expectation 
to confront that history. I did not know how that narrative of crossing something both indelible and 
invented resonated in me. But whatever materials embody it, I know its crossing to be a productive 
dialectic. In that display case were photographs of border monuments used as representations of a border 
between Mexico and the United States. There was no fence, no wall, no guard tower or patrol. Though I’ll 
always remain uncertain of his exact longitude and latitude as he passed from one position to another, I was 
told my grandfather crossed the border some time in the 1940s, and he would have potentially passed 
between these markers, though he might not have seen them pass. They were photographs were of 
monoliths and obelisks, objects prompting divisions between worlds, between invented categories of 
beings. But those shaped stone pillars, seen on landscapes like those I had imagined and depicted as similar 
scenery collapsed so many of my concerns together, and eased expectations for myself. Those related 
visions of a history, a meeting of an imagined line and an unfolding of art objects let me appreciate and 
arrive at a conclusion that all experience brings me here, where a new attention to simple occurrences and 
coincidence can help me find a confident balance of knowing and not knowing, and to better engage that 
experience ahead. 
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Figure 1.5: Border Monument 227, from David Taylor's "Working the Line" project 
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